European Proposals for a Governance Adapted to the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century and for a Responsible, Plural and United World

Theses and Proposals

Pierre Calame

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Résumé

The enlargement and te deeper development of the European Union require some in-depth thinking on European governance. This issue, however, cannot be dossiciated from another, much broader issue : public action is in crisis at every level and globalisation calss for setting up a true world governance. Our proposals are therefore a contribution to a European doctrine of responsability in this area. Our ten proposals are the following :

- Draft the Charter of Europe for a Responsible, Plural and United World and open a debate on it.
- Set up a European public forum of citizens debate
- Found governance on a new approach to territories
- Establish new relations between public institutions and the rest of society
- Reform European institutions according to the active subsidiarity principle and apply the latter to European policies
- Reform the European Union's founding policies : the agricultural policy as an example
- Set up a "European public management" task force for intervention on behalf of countries that request it, in particular the new democratic countries and countries in transition
- Promote a new world governance
- Reinforce relations between Europe and the countries of the South:
 - coalition on the Kyoto agreements
 - joint action for the reform of the WTO
 - preventive-action policy in favour of peace

- support to the development of the civil society of the South on a regional level
- a generations contract with Africa (a plan that covers several generations)
- Prepare a European Constituent Assembly including representatives of the different social and professional spheres to draw up the European Charter and the draft of a Constitution

Mots-clés thématiques : GLOBALISATION; SOCIETE CIVILE MONDIALE; POLITIQUE; CITOYENNETE; ETHIQUE; DEMOCRATIE; AGRICULTURE; GOUVERNANCE MONDIALE

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European Proposals for a Governance Adapted to the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century and for a Responsible, Plural and United World

Foreword

1. The European Union's inability to reconsider its way of functioning, in the twofold perspective of its enlargement to other countries and its deeper development, shows that "European governance" cannot be limited to a simple redefinition of the respective roles of the Union and the Member States. The way States function and democracy itself need to be reconsidered at the same time, along with the reconsideration of relations between the States and the other scales of governance, from the territorial communities to the international community.

It will not be possible to implement a fundamental reform of European governance without first developing **new European thinking on governance**.

2. The mandate for the elaboration of the White Paper on the governance of the European Union includes as one of its six major work areas, the European Union's position with respect to world governance. Indeed, interdependence amongst societies has become such, on a global level, that a historic, cultural, political and economic body as important as Europe cannot be conceived in the long term other than in terms of its relations with the other parts of the world. To do otherwise would mean, for Europe, condemning it to inefficiency and denying its responsibilities.

3. The European Union, even after the planned enlargement of the next decade, cannot claim to represent all of Europe.

For these three reasons, the Proposal Paper that follows does not deal solely, nor even mainly, with the institutional reform of the European Union. Its purpose is to lay the foundations for European thinking on governance.

THESES:

Thesis 1: Globalisation is not purely economic globalisation. It needs to be supported by new regulations.

Thesis 2: To face the challenges of the twenty-first century, major mutations are indispensable.

Thesis 3: Given the major actors' inability to design and to guide these mutations, a "world civil society" needs to be built.

Thesis 4: Europe must make proposals on world governance and accept to be a major actor in the management of the planet.

Thesis 5: Regional entities will play a crucial role in world governance. Despite its limits and crises, the European Union is the prototype for the construction of regional entities.

Thesis 6: In spite of the obvious triumph of democracy, a crisis in public action is observed almost everywhere in the world; the difficulty of reforming public action is the best argument of the neoliberal conservative revolution. Hence the need to truly understand the foundations of the generalised crisis in governance and to define the fundamental principles of European governance.

Thesis 7: European citizenship, just as Europe's position with respect to the world, can only be defined as a balance of rights and duties, and of freedoms and responsibilities.

I) THESES:

Thesis 1: Globalisation is not purely economic globalisation. It needs to be supported by new regulations.

From governance – the state, world governance – to the place of values in the construction of the world of tomorrow, what is being questioned is the nature of the civilisation now emerging. A divide between two visions of globalisation has been revealed: a fork in the road before us, a bifurcation that challenges every person, society and nation, and the entire emerging world community.

This bifurcation is determined by the very definition of globalisation. In the media, in the rhetoric, in the many debates, there is a fuzzy use of the word "globalisation", a single term in the English language, which translates into two different terms in Latin-based languages (*"mundialización"* and *"globalización"* in Spanish, and *"mondialisation"* and *"globalisation"* in French, for instance). "Globalisation" covers a great diversity of phenomena: Internet technology, trade and its liberalisation, the universal circulation of U.S. culture, the greenhouse effect, etc.

Let us agree that we are dealing with two radically different questions: that of the mondialisation form of globalisation (to which we shall refer simply as "globalisation" in the remainder of this document); and that of economic globalisation.

Globalisation (*mondialisation*) is the reality and the awareness of the common destiny of humankind, which is at the same time united and deeply diverse. It is the awareness of being in the same boat, where the limits are clear and which is both populated and fragile, in the same biosphere, in which all parts are interdependent. The stake, here, is to move urgently from the feeling of a common humankind to the construction of a true world community.

Economic globalisation is a **belief**, propagated mainly by the rich countries, according to which the common progress of humankind is automatically guaranteed by free trade, by the commodification of everything and by the progress of science and technology.

Globalisation is unavoidable, a source of crisis but also an opportunity for major human progress. We cannot escape it. While *economic* globalisation, like any economic and political doctrine, should be judged with lucidity in terms of its effects, it should be open to debate (on its conceptual and cultural foundations and its practices) by the peoples and the social groups that are sustaining its effects, as much the negative as the positive ones.

The divide runs between: those who think that globalisation and economic globalisation are one and the same reality, drawing from globalisation its irreversible character and from economic globalisation its mechanisms and its driving forces; and those who think that we are dealing with two realities, which, granted, are connected (the Internet is both a tool for the globalisation of exchanges and a potential tool for the awareness of a common destiny) but nevertheless deeply different. This leads to two radically different visions of the idea of "humanising globalisation". For the former, the idea is simply to complete the economic globalisation process and to correct its imperfections, in particular poverty and environmental damage. For the latter, the idea is to build a world human community that is able to take charge of its destiny.

[This divide can be illustrated in a great many specific areas.

A - Democracy

Economic globalisation advocates place the accent on generalising representative democracy. Globalisation advocates, while greeting the advent of democracy, also see its twofold crisis: Nation-States are powerless, singly, in weighing on the destiny of societies; and the voting mechanisms in many countries are affected by vast corruption. According to them, we need to return to the very root of democracy, which is to allow everyone - not just the most powerful - to be an actor in his or her future and therefore to allow the development, on the international scale, of networks to discuss and work on our common challenges, materialising the link between the local and the global.

B - Culture

Economic globalisation advocates see culture as just another commodity and cultures competing with one another, symbolised by "cultural products" that are manufactured by an industry. Globalisation advocates see culture, on the contrary, as the foundation of societies and the profound resources of peoples. In this view, **cultural diversity is seen as humankind's true common good**. Under these conditions, dialogue amongst the cultures – true, respectful dialogue – aimed at searching for common principles to manage the planet together is an essential priority.

C - The Economy

Economic globalisation advocates consider that extending the market economy to all areas of human activity is the best guarantee for good management and for material development, which is assimilated to human development. Their reasoning spreads to the majority of common goods and in particular to natural resources and to knowledge, which are seen as having to enter the market economy, with the help of a few arrangements making it possible to integrate a number of external costs into their price. According to them, the WTO's mission is to make sure that the liberalisation of all forms of exchange is applied as fast as possible and they would like the environment and culture to be part of this rationale. They consider poverty in the world as a problem that has not yet been solved but that is not directly connected to the economic globalisation of exchanges, and that economic globalisation will also be the major tool for eradicating poverty, with the help of some appropriate policies designed to integrate into the market those who are so far excluded from it.

Globalisation advocates also see the market economy as a valuable tool and the development of exchanges as a factor of peace. They differ in that they consider that classic economics has a limited field of application, that its pretence of imposition on the whole world is exorbitant. that the liberalisation of exchanges is not an end in itself and supposes public regulations of the same scale and of the same efficiency. Far from advocating the acceleration of market liberalisation they consider that it is more urgent to design and set up the public regulations that global interdependence requires. They observe that material development is not an end in itself either, that it must be put at the service of the human development and that the two forms of development, material and human, are neither synonymous nor necessarily interrelated. They observe that the present forms of economic development are not viable in the long run. Faced with the very fast growth of inequalities in the world, globalisation advocates observe that such growth has taken place at the same time as the liberalisation of exchanges has developed and that the latter has contributed to the former. Finally, they observe that the promotion of a social model based entirely on material accumulation and on the exchange of merchandise has contributed to the depreciation of traditional cultures and to the dislocation of networks of relations, which are two essential dimensions in the causes of poverty. Under these conditions, the re-appreciation of this image and the construction of networks and relations not based on trade appear to them to be essential elements of the fight against poverty.

D - The Construction of World Governance

For economic globalisation advocates, world governance aims to create the conditions of "good governance" on the national scale, meaning the conditions for safe investment, to express international solidarity through large-scale programmes and to include, increasingly, social and environmental considerations in the prices.

Globalisation advocates believe that it is necessary to refound the international community on the threefold principle of active subsidiarity, responsibility and plurality. Without underestimating the role of states and companies, they stress the importance of building a pluralistic civil society that is able to advance proposals that are ethical, conceptual, institutional and practical all at once, enhanced by the concrete experience of actors on the field.

E - The Quest for Meaning and Direction

For economic globalisation advocates, meaning and direction are not an issue. Scientific and economic development have their own ends inherent to them. The issue of meaning and direction is thus reduced to the issue of ethics, limited in turn to a collection of professional ethics.

For globalisation advocates, the meaning and direction of societies and of the human adventure are on the contrary essential, and spirituality in multiple forms, religious or not, is a major dimension of human beings and their development. Observing that humankind is facing common challenges and a deep crisis of meaning and direction, they call for a dialogue amongst religions and philosophies of different traditions, not in the hope of determining a universal truth but in the hope of **reaching an agreement on common principles for tomorrow's shared management of the planet**. We stand firmly on the globalisation (*mondialisation*) position, amongst those who consider that it is indispensable for humankind to endow itself at every level with new regulations that measure up to the challenges of the twenty-first century, that measure up to globalisation.]

Thesis 2: To face the challenges of the twenty-first century, major mutations are indispensable.

The twenty-first century will not simply be an extension of the twentieth century. The last two decades of the twentieth century already pointed to the mutations to come. These are summarised in the concept - however vague - of sustainable development.

Sustainable development is a concept that began to be widely used in the eighties, especially after the publication of the Brundtland Report, "Our Common Future".

The concept appeared when people became aware that the current economic and industrial development model – which came into existence between the sixteenth and the nineteenth century in the West, then spread to the rest of the world – was not actually sustainable, that is, that it could not ensure the future in the long run, i.e. make provisions for future generations.

Quite often, discussions on sustainable development include environmental issues only. In fact, people's concern about the pitfalls of the current development model first arose from the imbalance between the amount of natural resources used by humankind and the capacity of our planet to renew them. The increasing imbalance is patent both on the local and global scale: soil impoverishment and desertification, scarcity and the low quality of water or climate change with already tangible effects. According to commonly quoted figures, 20% of the world's population is currently using 80% of natural resources, whereas 80% of the population has to make do with the remaining 20% of natural resources. Furthermore, since *1995 humankind has been using approximately 150% of the total amount of resources that the planet has been able to regenerate.* This means that our generation, and, of course, rich societies in particular, are using the reserves – fossil-fuel reserves mainly – that have accumulated for several million years. We are living beyond our means - on credit, as it were. This is reason why the proverb "We do not inherit the Earth from our Ancestors, we borrow it from our children" has become so popular. Speaking of sustainable development is the same as simply asking ourselves what planet our children, our grandchildren, our grandchildren will inherit.

But the concept of sustainable development has led to a larger analysis of the pitfalls of the current development model. *These pitfalls involve relational crises*: a crisis amongst human beings, as shown by faltering solidarity and social cohesion, the coexistence of poverty and luxury even in rich countries; a crisis amongst societies, as shown by the gap between rich and poor regions, between rich and poor societies, sometimes within the same country; and a crisis between humankind and the biosphere.

These crises are not simply due to a lack of foresight, they cannot be solved simply by applying technical measures, simply by protecting the environment, for instance. These crises result from

our perception of the market, of science: we see them as sacred, as if the market could regulate everything, including the distribution of wealth, and as if science could solve everything.

It is not the role of the market or of science that is called into question. The market has proved to be a very effective means of democratically linking resources, capacities and needs. Science, in conjunction with technology, has allowed to free humankind from precariousness. However, as it often happens, the victory of science and of the market has brought their own limits to light.

Humankind, with powerful means at its disposal, has drastically altered the balance of the planet; it is therefore accountable in many respects, for its own destiny. Nevertheless, powerful as they may be, the means through which humankind has attained its new position as a major actor provide no hint as to what the course of action should be taken in order for us to avoid becoming our own victims. Market and science are just means of doing something. If we turn them into ends, if we allow them to take the lead, if we do not control and channel them, humankind will lose its meaning and direction and will put itself in danger.

[Why has this change resulted in a series of relational crises amongst human beings, amongst societies and between humankind and the biosphere? The market and science illustrate the answer:

The market is very well suited to **one category** of goods: the goods that are the fruit of our intellectual capacity and that are **divided** when shared, that is, mainly industrial goods. On the other hand, the market is not suited for the other three categories of goods upon which human life and development are dependent:

- First, the goods that are **destroyed** when shared; they belong to the large category of **common** goods and are subject to collective management.
- Second, the goods that are **divided** when shared but that are not essentially the result of human activity; they belong to the category of natural resources, which should be shared out according to the principles of **social justice** rather than those of the market economy.
- Third, the most interesting goods for the future, those that **multiply** when shared: knowledge, intelligence, beauty, love, experience, etc.; logically, such goods should not fall within the province of the market, rather, they should come under the scope of **reciprocity**-based policies: I receive something because I give something.

Setting the market out as an absolute value and as an infallible means of sharing out goods rationally is tantamount to reducing the four categories of goods into one: the commodities category. In doing so, we destroy the first category of goods - (the common good and the ecosystems), we promote injustice by allowing the rich minority to hog the natural resources and we deprive of knowledge and experience those who cannot afford them, since these goods have now become artificially scarce. What is more, we pave the way for an economy that ignores the value of relationships, that underestimates or overlooks anything that does not have a market value.

Science and technology also play an important role. They are used as a means of dominating nature or standing in for it. This approach to technology, together with the ensuing reduction in transport costs, leads to the final inclusion of all goods and services into a single anonymous

market. The European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is an illustration of this. The CAP is currently undergoing a deep crisis. It supports an agriculture that has overlooked the subtle balance of ecosystems and has ultimately lost the great agricultural know-how that had accumulated over several hundred years. Agricultural production has become an industrial activity which, like many others, is heavily dependent on chemical industries, is aimed at supplying an anonymous global market, and thrives on public subsidies. As a consequence, agriculture, which had been the main link between humankind and nature and amongst human beings themselves for centuries, has lost its linking function, a loss that has resulted in the present crisis. Yes, we have managed to increase production, but land is becoming less fertile, water is getting polluted, the mad-cow disease has been a very serious blow to consumers' confidence, the countryside has been deserted and our agricultural surplus destabilises the agricultural economy of other countries from the South. To counteract all these effects, the CAP, which had been legitimately designed to meet food needs in Europe, is going to be reviewed for it has led to an absurd situation.

What has been said about agriculture also applies to industry. Industrial activities have gradually evolved into specialised technical practices that lack local roots and result in the creation of an increasingly abstract link between manufacturers and end users: hence the industry's inability to deal with horizontal relations amongst people, and between humankind and the environment.]

Thus, the twenty-first century will not simply be an extension of the twentieth century, on the contrary, it will call for **mutations**; these mutations will call for a change in the very **systems of thought**; change in the systems of thought depends above all on governance, that is, it will only be accomplished if new social, institutional, legal and political **regulation systems** are put into practice.

The broad world transformation currently under way calls into question the mental categories that have shaped European thinking over the centuries or even several thousand years.

The new century will certainly be a period of important mutations, with such far-reaching effects, in such a variety of contexts, that they can be compared to the mutations that took Europe from the Middle Ages to the Modern Age through the development of science, the Nation-State and industry. Theses mutations will have an influence on all the spheres of life: systems of values and symbols, education, production and exchanges, habits, currency, governance, the relations between humankind and the biosphere, etc.

The issue is not whether we and the next generation wish to accept these mutations. They are ineluctable. The issue at stake is what price we will have to pay. Basically, the answer depends on our collective capacity to anticipate and take the initiative.

Thesis 3: Given the major actors' inability to design and to guide these mutations, a "world civil society" needs to be built.

Who can design and guide the big mutations of the twenty-first century? Apparently, not the traditional major social and political traditional players, the scientific community, the states or the big companies that might be expected to do so. They are prisoners of their own strategies, they

are too conditioned by vested interests; their geographical scope and sphere of activity are too narrow for them to be able to take effective measures. Who, then, is up to this task?

It is truly the challenge of the world civil society under construction. If we want our grandchildren to inherit a world fit to live in, we must quickly work out new strategies that will contribute to the consolidation of a world civility. The international community remains to be built. Over the last decades, global solidarity and the very role of humankind have raised people's awareness. In the late forties, "the citizens of the world" became aware of these matters but they were in somewhat of a hurry: they claimed that the incipient awareness that had been raised should necessarily result in the application of political citizenship and representative democracy on a world scale. From this, we are still a long way off. On the other hand, the way we see ourselves and the world has changed rapidly: from the emotional discovery of our blue planet as seen from a satellite to the UN world conferences, from television to the Internet, to thriving international trade, all of this contributes to a fast-evolving picture of ourselves and of the world.

The most noticeable expression of this evolution is the quick development of new forms of nongovernmental international organisations, or NGOs. They are more flexible than the former large top-down organisations, they are used to working in connection with other organisations, they have been able to take advantage of the Internet from an early start, they can react quickly and they always take the new aspirations of society into account: this is why international nongovernmental organisations have played an important role in the evolution of ideas, habits, laws and institutions. Ecology, human rights, equity between men and women, international solidarity, housing rights, homosexuality, the challenging of states and of international institutions, fair trade, boycotting companies, ethical investment, economy in solidarity, free software... these are the areas in which NGOs operate. Previously, most of them had been dealt with by the "mighty", with a mixture of indulgence and exasperation, until they became central issues in the political arena. Is this enough? Certainly not.

The building of the world civil society has reached its third phase. The first, which ended in the nineties, was essentially a period of denouncement and resistance. The second stretched through the nineties and included several UN conferences. This period began in 1992 with the Rio World Summit. NGOs began to take part in discussions with states and international institutions but stuck to their agenda. The third phase begins now and it means to fulfil new ambitions. Following others' directions is no longer enough. The world civil society has to take the initiative and define the issues that have to be dealt with. Resistance is no longer enough; we need to define the mutations that need to be undertaken, as well as their consequences. Single selective campaigns are no longer enough. Alliances amongst NGOs need to be set up so as to treat issues thoroughly. Seeing the world as a united entity is no longer enough; its diversity must also be taken into account.

Thesis 4: Europe must make proposals on world governance and accept to be a major actor in the management of the planet.

Europe's responsibility in terms of world governance stems from the very nature of Europe, on the one hand, and from the experience derived from the gradual building of the European Union on the other.

A – The very nature of Europe gives it a major responsibility in the management of the planet

This is so, first of all, because of its **economic weight**. The European Union, even before its enlargement, was – and is – the first world economic player. This is sometimes forgotten because of Europe's political weakness, but this cannot last forever. Europe will have to accept its share of involvement in the management of the world, all the more so that it contains the seeds of a less predatory development model than that of the United States and that it promotes a relation between the market and public regulations that is more balanced than the one usually ensuing from a "full market" economy.

Europe's responsibility also stems from its cultural diversity. Europe is made up of old civilisations with a common historical and cultural basis, so much so, that the idea of a United Europe has never disappeared despite the pressure of particularisms and of nationalism. Nevertheless, each one of these civilisations has its own history and identity. Europe has a wide variety of climates, ecosystems and cultures. From the very beginning, it was clear that this diversity had to be appreciated and taken into account in the construction of Europe, which thus stands as a model of "unity in diversity", very different from the American model, which is based on the diversity of communities within a single civilisation. In fact, the European model, which encompasses unity and diversity, can be applied to the whole planet more easily than the American model.

Finally, Europe's historical responsibility in relation to the world stems from its **philosophical tradition**. An effort has been made in Europe over the centuries **to think in universal terms**. This tradition gives Europe duties at a time when thinking in universal terms is not a philosophical question but a concrete, urgent demand.

B – The construction process of the European Union makes it a fundamental reference from which lessons can be drawn for the construction of a world governance

Several projects based on regional groupings are currently under way now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century (European Union, NAFTA, South Cone, ASEAN, etc.) and history provides many examples of independent peoples and communities who voluntarily grouped together and worked out a suitable co-operation plan to manage their common affairs. The strategy has been applied on a small scale, as in the case of Switzerland, as well as on a larger scale, as in the case of the United States. However, the most significant and remarkable political event in the last fifty years is the building of the European Union. Even though Europeans are rather sceptical about their capacity to endow Europe with a real political dimension, the European example is sometimes seen as a threat – because of Europe's economic weight and its penchant for protectionism – but it is more usually seen as reference, as a model.

[Foreigners are even more fascinated by the scope of the project, by the conditions in which Europe has been forged, than Europeans. Indeed, when we think about the two World Wars – which broke out in the twentieth century as an expression of the rivalry amongst European countries – when we think that the World War II ended in 1945 and that in 1946 a small group of men and women were already working to lay the foundations of common co-operation, with French and Germans putting an end to their long-lasting enmity and becoming the pillars of a

new European reality, we would dare say that it is a miracle. A miracle but also an ambition. At a moment in our history when a feeling of powerlessness is prevailing and has generated a loss of confidence in the future, and when projects, especially political ones, are seen as precarious and artificial, it is important to remember that at a very hard moment in the history of the world – at the end of what turned out to be the bloodiest conflict of all – a small group of people realised that they could something and succeed in their ambition. They did, and in doing so, they brought deep changes in the destiny of Europe. This lesson in determination can help the new generation to be hopeful.

The evolution of Europe over the last fifty years shows that trying to manage interdependencies should not be seen as Utopian, that we have been able to find the necessary means and institutions to achieve our goals, even though the task was arduous. Countries that were enemies until recently have proven that they could overcome their war wounds and surmount their mutual mistrust. In those countries, a handful of individuals managed to bridge the gap between the apparently foolish belief that international institutions could be thoroughly changed and the first pragmatic steps to take in that direction. Europe has succeeded in associating, within it, countries with extremely different standards of living without inducing disasters. It has refused to leave everything in the hands of the market, it has worked out strategies of solidarity that were finally accepted, even by the advocates of the toughest forms of free trade. It has proven that these strategies can be applied beyond the boundaries of the Nation-State without destroying the dynamics of the market. By doing so, Europe has demonstrated that solidarity has allowed to safeguard and develop a civilisation that has sought a balance between individual freedom and the common good. This is the very balance other regions of the world are striving for.

On reviewing the history of Europe, we find that building a supranational system involves four major conditions:

- the awareness of a crisis that implies the need to react;
- the existence of a vision borne by the civil society and the younger generations;
- the identification of the specific driving forces of integration;
- setting up institutions that guarantee the building process in the long run and a balance between interdependence and diversity.

Awareness of the crisis

It is said that the need to build a new Europe arose from the suffering and the disasters caused by the war. Does this mean that everywhere else we have to wait for a tragedy of this dimension before we can begin to allow reason to prevail? Hopefully not. The crisis is here already. In many countries, especially in the South, the concept of national sovereignty is increasingly deprived of meaning and the populations are well aware of it. This crisis of sovereignty is coupled with a crisis of political legitimacy. In many cases, the political elite have lost their credit. Given the way they have dealt with the major market and scientific forces, given the importance of international institutions, politicians are seen as exercising power more to further special interests than as a means for peoples to weigh upon their future collectively.

Many feel that our development model has reached a dead end. There are things that have to be achieved at all costs, and they call for global mobilisation: water, land, energy management, the management of humankind's common goods. With no common rules, economic globalisation has become a jungle. In many parts of the world, society has become increasingly bipolar, with one part of the population – the number can fluctuate – integrated into and benefiting form the global market while the other is increasingly excluded and marginalized. Except perhaps for continent-states such as China and India, no single nation-state can alter these trends on its own because none can define the rules of the game. At the very most, nation-states can vigorously carve out a niche in the global market for themselves by making the most out of their intellectual and creative capacities and fostering cohesion, as in the case of the Asian emerging powers. Let us hope that the urgent need for regulations and a shared awareness of the crisis will suffice to counteract institutional inertia and the vested interests of the national elites.

Existence of a vision

Dreams and passion, rather than interests, are the driving forces that move people into action. It will be the role of the younger generations, for whom the Internet is a part of everyday life, to build tomorrow's world. They will detect its interdependencies, they will warn against the dangers that threaten it. They will dare to wish for a responsible and united society. Without this vision, the implementation of technocratic devices will not be possible, and if it was, it would make no sense. Similarly, there is no doubt as to the need for a global mobilisation of civil societies analogous to the Hague Conference in 1948. For we need to build a common discourse on meaning and direction before thinking of building institutional devices.

Identification of the driving forces of integration

To succeed in changing things, we need to identify who is asking for such change and the specific questions with which to start. We need methods, stages, and to know which specific problems we are going to deal with first. "We must help people articulate their demands, help them become aware that they can legitimately ask for a number of things, help them put forward specific proposals. If we want rulers to take opinion into account, we must be able to get organised and put forward coherent, well-articulated arguments. A politician does not raise questions that no one else raises: that would be suicidal. If, however, he feels that public opinion is building, that it remains within reason, he will give it due consideration, all the more so that politicians are no longer sure of their legitimacy, given the material interdependence that characterises international life and everybody's daily life. If those amongst those asking for a change awareness is organised, a response is likely: things change when many people are aware of danger at the same time. This is what is happens now: globalisation is a major opportunity but it also carries danger and everybody can see it".

Seeking appropriate institutional forms

European institutions are obviously not replicable as such. Nevertheless, they have revealed a number of principles of a more general scope:

* The balance between diversity and interdependence. Reconciling the cultures of different nations with the need to suppress nationalism is clearly the main issue. One of the world's most outstanding features is its diversity. We complain about the large number of European directives. Most of them, however, result from the importance given to the single market and therefore to the conditions for competition. In other parts of the world, the creation of a single market may not be seen as a crucial factor. Nevertheless, the active solidarity principle could be applied everywhere: the countries involved jointly decide what results they wish to obtain, but each country decides on how it is going to obtain them, in terms of its specificities.

* The pawl effect. Rightly enough, at a very early stage, the founders of Europe set up institutions that would guarantee long-term implementation of agreements that might otherwise have been precarious.

* Institutions that are compatible with the reality of national administrative and political structures. The functioning of European institutions has assumed the participation of democratic nations where law is respected and administrations efficient on the whole. In countries where these conditions are not yet met, we will probably need to invent more rudimentary systems of regional integration, at least to start with.

* **Representatives of the common interest**. The European system includes both the idea that a commission representing the common interest is solely authorised to make proposals and the idea of establishing a balance this common body and national representation. Together, these ideas are a major innovation and are probably the keystone for any learning process in regional co-operation.]

Thesis 5: Regional entities will play a crucial role in world governance. Despite its limits and crises, the European union is the prototype for the construction of regional entities.

The management of global security and the elaboration of a multilateral agenda cannot be proportionally shared out between the North and the South unless large regional entities are formed. Such entities should not only be single economic markets but also political and institutional realities, acting as efficient interfaces between the national and global levels.

Following the liberalisation of international exchanges, economic and social regional sub-entities, such as the European Union, have spontaneously come into existence. It has turned out that, far from being an obstacle to exchanges, these sub-entities actually boost globalisation by applying and adopting free-circulation regulations within their boundaries.

[To speed up the formation of regional sub-entities, three different kinds of measures have to be applied:

• The representatives sitting in the international agencies and institutions must act on behalf of regional entities and each representative must then be accountable to the countries of the region he represents.

- The regional scale must be given top consideration in negotiations and decisionmaking processes. This applies to the ineluctable reform of the UN Security Council, which should be made up of representatives of the regions of the world. Each country of a region would take turns as chair of the region and, consequently, represent the region in international negotiations. The concerted action of the European Union already illustrates this principle.
- When dealing with essential principles formulated at the global level, it should be possible, according to the principle of active subsidiarity, to specify a set of rules of international law at the regional scale.]

Thesis 6: In spite of the obvious triumph of democracy, a crisis in public action is observed almost everywhere in the world; the difficulty of reforming public action is the best argument of the neoliberal conservative revolution. Hence the need to truly understand the foundations of the generalised crisis in governance and to define the fundamental principles of European governance.

Between 1960 and 1990, the triumph of the state was replaced by a crisis in public action.

The difficulty in reforming public action and the state is the best argument of the neoliberal conservative revolution. This difficulty in carrying out a reform and the subsequent privatisation of public services, which hands to others the responsibility of modernisation, remind us of companies that resort to technical modernisation in order to avoid dealing with the difficult problem of staff management.

And yet economic globalisation is not the same as globalisation, and governance is not just limited to public administration or the legal status of public services.

Governance is at the core of our societies and the reform of public action is a major political issue now that currency, defence, foreign policy, the main political concerns in the past, have disappeared.

Hence the need to:

- understand the causes of the difficulty in reforming political action,
- define new prospects,
- design the strategies for change.

A – The sources of the inadequacy of current public action and the causes of the powerlessness to reform it

They are of four natures.

- **The scales** are inadequate: the nation-state, direct descendant of the Greek city-state, is still the major, though inadequate, framework for regulations; the administrative and political frameworks are lagging in their evolution to face reality of interdependence.
- The concepts are inadequate, in particular:
 - management at a single territorial scale and the rigid assignment of competences to each territorial level;
 - the state prevails over civil society; the equality of citizens is ensured through the application of abstract and uniform rules;
 - political and administrative issues designed as belonging to two separate spheres;
 - politics seen as consisting in choosing from amongst alternative solutions rather than as the organisation of a process of elaboration of solutions;
 - the identity of the function and of the status of what is private and what is public.

• The administrative culture is inadequate:

- public administration claims to prevail over society,
- horizontal and vertical compartmentalisation,
- implementation of abstract rules,
- complying with rules is more important for civil servants than being relevant,
- civil servants are asked to keep their feelings at bay as well as their desire to have things make sense.
- The strategies of political reform are inadequate:
 - they are not designed to take the long term into account,
 - they are locked up in traditional concepts,
 - they do not call upon civil servants' desire to have things make sense,
 - they sustain the illusion of instrumental modernisation,
 - they are hampered by the lack of intellectual investment in public management,
 - they refuse to get into "the thick of the State" and they perpetuate a top-down view of reforms.

B - And yet the new perspectives of governance are clear:

They are based on **some fundamental ideas:**

- Governance is a fractal phenomenon (the same rules are found at all levels from local to global).
- Governance is the art of combining unity with diversity.
- Relations between the state and society must be set on new foundations.
- Articulating the different levels of governance is more important than managing one level of governance.
- The new forms of relations between the state and society are defined by two rules: be with, do with

"Everything that is done for others without the others is done against the others."

These new relations imply three duties for public power:

- The duty of intelligibility:
 - Intelligibility of the state: the ethics of the rule
 - Intelligibility of society: providing society with the means for understanding itself and with dialogue forums.
- The duty of dialogue: others with their irreducible differences
- The duty of projects: conducting shared ventures.
- They promote the articulation of the different scales of governance: the active subsidiarity principle
 - Placing the accent on the elaboration of solutions worked out in partnership rather than choosing from a set of alternative solutions.
 - Switching from the obligation of means to the duty to obtain a given result
 - The cycle of governance
- The duty to be relevant
- They are based on a better distinction between the "power of proposal" and the "power of decision"

Thesis 7: European citizenship, just as Europe's position with respect to the world, can only be defined as a balance of rights and duties, and of freedoms and responsibilities.

Since the Maastricht Treaty, the citizens of the countries of the Union are also European citizens. But how can this legal reality become a living reality? What should European citizenship be and how can it be built so that it is an invigorating reality? Here are a few principles:

A - How should European citizenship be conceived?

Citizenship is "multilevel" - local, national, European, global. The "multilevel" nature of citizenship has a corollary in the articulation amongst those levels: How does one belong simultaneously to different-sized communities? There can therefore be no true European citizenship unless there is, in Europe, a philosophy of governance that specifically considers the articulation of the different scales of governance and the articulation of the different levels of exchange. Consequently, the debate on European governance implies a European debate on governance (from the local to the global).

Awareness of citizenship and belonging to a community are both based on the **balance between rights and duties**, freedom and responsibility. European citizenship can therefore not be based only on a Charter of Fundamental Rights, it also requires a **Charter for a Responsible**, **Plural and United Europe**. Awareness of European citizenship thus requires being attached to an **awareness of Europe's responsibilities to the world community**.

B - How can European citizenship be reinforced?

For there to be European citizenship, there has to be a **European public debate** that breaks with the form of dialogue that begins by postulating the existence of national interests then sets them up against one another.

The **European Commission's priority** should be to support the emergence of such European public debates; there can be no citizenship without a forum of public debate.

Public debate must be worked into a **strategy for the construction of a European civil society** through a "socioprofessional" approach (construction of the collective point of view of the different social and professional groups). This European civil society is also **part of the world civil society in construction.**

PROPOSALS

Proposal 1: Draft the Charter of Europe for a Responsible, Plural and United World and open a debate on it.

Proposal 2: Set up a European public forum of citizens debate.

Proposal 3: Found governance on a new approach to territories.

Proposal 4: Establish new relations between public institutions and the rest of society.

Proposal 5: Reform European institutions according to the active subsidiarity principle and apply the latter to European policies.

Proposal 6: Reform the European Union's founding policies: the agricultural policy as an example.

Proposal 7: Set up a "European public management" task force for intervention on behalf of countries that request it, in particular the new democratic countries and countries in transition.

Proposal 8: Promote a new world governance.

{{Proposal 9: Reinforce relations between Europe and the countries of the South:

- coalition on the Kyoto agreements;
- joint action for the reform of the WTO;
- preventive-action policy in favour of peace;
- support to the development of the civil society of the South on a regional level;
- a generations contract with Africa (a plan that covers several generations)

Proposal 10: Prepare a European Constituent Assembly including representatives of the different social and professional spheres to draw up the European Charter and the draft of a Constitution

Proposal 1: Draft the Charter of Europe for a Responsible, Plural and United World and open a debate on it.

A - A European Charter should be set in the broader context of the elaboration of a common ethical and legal core for the planet constituting a Charter for a Responsible, Plural, and United World.

A *Charter*, i.e. a fundamental agreement amongst the parties. A reference document, previous to a constitution, previous to the law and to the laws. A Charter is a text signed by people, countries, and institutions thereby indicating their commitment to it. A reference document of twofold acknowledgement: the signatories' self-acknowledgement in the content of the Charter; their acknowledgement of the other signatories, with regard to whom they make a commitment.

A Charter for: it is not a reference document in the abstract, a text of ethical principles. It is a charter in view of something. In view of a responsible, plural and united world. Its evaluation criteria are therefore not only the truth of what is said, but also, and above all, its operationality: Does the Charter contribute to moving towards a more responsible, more plural, and more united world? The Charter, so to speak, gathers its signatories around this common aim. It thereby generates relations to others.

A Charter for a world. It is therefore placed beyond the nations, beyond even the United Nations, which expressed the international order resulting from World War II. A world, which means that it includes both the relations within humankind and the relations between humankind and the biosphere. A world, which means that it very explicitly reflects the current process of globalisation. It takes a position on the nature of globalisation. A world, which means that it is placed beyond the rights and the dignity of individuals, which is dealt with by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as beyond the issue of peace amongst the nations, which is dealt with by the Charter of the United Nations. It embraces both of these within a larger whole: a responsible, plural and united world.

A Charter for a responsible world. In fact, a responsible humankind. The Charter supplies, at the outset, a new, much broader definition of responsibility. First of all, it is not only interested in responsible individuals, its interest is a responsible world, a responsible humankind. It recognises the collective dimension of responsibility, given the societal and environmental impacts resulting very largely from the sum of our behaviour.

Such responsibility also refers to the possibility of awareness. To deny one's responsibility, one might say "I didn't know". To this, however, the answer will be: "You had the possibility of knowing." Typically, this involves the responsibility of consumers, scientists, shareholders, company managers, professionals. Responsibility is enlarged to include to the duty of awareness.

[Such responsibility thus refers to the impact of an action, regardless of the intention that governed it or of the precise nature of the action. Such responsibility does not question the purity of intentions or the legality of actions. It only looks at the result. This view of responsibility is essential with regard to all those who shape or influence opinion, the media, religious leaders, educators, scientists, etc. They cannot limit their responsibility to their internal professional ethics. The purity of a scientist's intentions and his scruples in establishing the truth do not fully cover – far from it – the issue of the impact of his action, hence the issue of his responsibility.

Finally, such responsibility also refers to the possibility of freedom and to the possibility of power. As for awareness, we are still dealing with what is potential, not only with the reality of the moment. One could always say, and, as ordinary citizens, scientists, company managers, or

shareholders we often do: "There was nothing I could do", "I was as powerless as dust in mechanisms beyond my control"; from the moment that I did not connect to others, from the moment that I did not do what I had to do to override my powerlessness, then I bear responsibility. This is a very important point, for example, with regard to the university. Every university and every faculty within a university can be considered as depending on institutional or economic rationales that are beyond its control; it bears responsibility from the moment that **it did not do everything it needed to do to build networks capable of speaking out.** In the Platform for a Responsible and United World, written in 1993, we had already advanced the principle of responsibility, highlighting that everyone's responsibility was involved in proportion to their knowledge and their power. Similarly, one's responsibility is involved in proportion to the rights that one has.

A Charter, finally, for a Plural and United World. What is interesting about these two words, "plural" and "united" is that they both refer simultaneously to the statement of a fact and to the expression of a value.

A plural world. This is the recognition of the diversity of the world, of its societies, of its cultures, of its ecosystems. This diversity is claimed simultaneously as a right, a right to difference, and as a value for the entire community.

The same twofold meaning, technical and ethical, for a united world: technically united in the sense that a building or an assembly is united, where the relations of the parts are what determine the solidity of the whole; morally united in the sense that we feel that which affects others, positively or negatively, as something that affects us too.

Thus, taking its different components, a Charter for a Responsible, Plural and United World is one of the elements that contributes to moving from the present state of globalized society to the awareness of a world community in construction. It is the third pillar of international life, next to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which places the accent on the dignity of individuals and on their rights, and of the Charter of the United Nations, which places the accent on peace and on development. The need for a third pillar emerged when awareness of environmental problems began. It was in the continuation of the first world conference on environment in Stockholm, 1972, that for the first time the idea of a third pillar, an Earth Charter, was debated. At the time, it was meant mainly to deal with the relations between humankind and the biosphere. The idea was taken up again at the Earth Summit in Rio, 1992. Its organisers hoped that the Summit would be the opportunity for states to agree on an Earth Charter. The hope was not fulfilled.

The need of a third pillar derives from the change in the state of the world. The first two pillars of international life, in particular the Charter of the United Nations, were developed in the intellectual and conceptual context of the "Westphalian order". A system of thought resulting from the Treaty of Westphalia, which in the seventeenth century put an end to the Thirty Years' War. The Westphalian order puts the sovereignty of states above everything, encloses the nation

and its economy within a territory, and makes relations amongst states the only foundation of international relations. However, in all these aspects, the world has undergone considerable transformations in the past fifty years.

a) The sovereignty of the Nation-State has lost a lot of its sense. The main political actor just yesterday, enjoying almost a monopoly in the definition and the management of the public good, undisputed in its legitimacy, the Nation-State was what was most at stake and the first to benefit from the struggles for independence. It is largely contested today in each of its traditional features: the main attributes of its sovereignty have disappeared, its bureaucratic methods are criticised, corruption has spread and is often notorious in the highest spheres of politics and the state, other public and private actors are competing with it for the management of the public good.

b) Nation-States are no longer the exclusive, nor even the main actors of world regulation. Actors that do not belong to the traditional political stage are now at the front of the international stage. They are, on the one hand, multinational corporations, and on the other, multinational NGOs. All of them act on a world scale and are involved in fields traditionally assigned to the public sector, such as the management of natural resources, or even diplomacy and security. All have acquired the means of observation and expertise on an international scale, often more sophisticated and more credible in the eyes of populations than those of the states and international institutions. More mobile than public systems, with a high command of international information systems, generating joint interests with the media, corporations and NGOs have become actors that can express the terms of the debate and formulate norms. Both through their impact and through the nature of what they deal with, multinational corporations and NGOs influence the nature and the management of public goods. The result is a disassociation between actors and what they deal with. The old opposition between public actor and public good on the one hand, and private actor and private good on the other has become inoperative. The responsibility of actors should henceforth derive not only from their nature but also from their influence. A private actor whose influence is of a public scope will no longer be able to hide behind its status to avoid obligations of a public nature. Finally, multinational corporations and NGOs, the new predominant actors of international life, have their own systems of assessment and sanction - shareholders and employees for corporations, members and fund providers for NGOs. This situation, foreign to classic democratic interplay, makes it necessary to invent new regulation mechanisms.

c) Real power has changed in nature. In an increasingly complex world, the power of expertise and of proposal often overrides the very power of decision, traditionally the realm of politics. However, this power of expertise and of proposal is increasingly held, or even monopolised, by professional bodies and technostructures: within the international institutions, within the states, within the corporations and even within the NGOs. These professional bodies command, amongst others, the technical terms of the debate, of the risk assessment and of the statement of the norm. The actors themselves can have cross-cutting interests. This can be seen in the civil nuclear sector. Cross-cutting interests are all the stronger that the career paths of the members of these professional bodies take them from one type organisation to another. These actors, illidentified because they are not assimilated to a particular institution, have also become decisive. **d)** The nature of the problems has changed. Inequality of access to natural resources and to technology has become worse by the year. The development myth, conceived just after the war as a strategy for the poor countries to catch up with the developed countries, has collapsed. Moreover, the consumption of natural resources now largely exceeds the regeneration capacities of the biosphere. The inability of the rich countries, at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, to reach a clear statement of the problem of the sharing of resources weighs very heavily on the future of international relations.

e) The life of a society and its economy are no longer identified with a territory and with the physical factors of production. The economy, following World War II, although already relying on sophisticated scientific and technological systems, was above all an economy of transformation and circulation of matter. Since then, the information revolution has come about and has extended to the living world through the progress of genetics and molecular biology. This information revolution is also a revolution in knowledge and an increasing number of people in the world has access to globalised – if not diversified – knowledge and information. And in fact, the rules for sharing information and knowledge are diametrically opposed to the rules for sharing matter, since the former increase when they are shared while the latter is divided when shared.

f) The impact of science and technology has increased considerably. One can even argue that risks, today, are not produced by nature, but are the consequence of the interplay amongst technological systems. This has led to a deep change in the perception of risks and of innovation.

All of these transformations have invalidated the great implicit or explicit social contracts that were built in the aftermath of World War II. We can take three examples of this: science, the university, and development.

The social contract relative to science was forged symbolically in the dialogue between President Franklin Roosevelt of the United States and the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, Vannevar Bush, towards the end of the war. Their dialogue states the terms of the contract very explicitly: sustainable peace will depend on social cohesion; the latter will depend on growth, which will depend on technological innovation, which itself will depend on basic research, provided that it is free and supported by the public authorities.

The social contract relative to the university is made of the same stuff. It appears very clearly, for example, in the founding text of the International Association of Universities (IAU), which underscores that research must be backed freely, whatever its consequences. It is the autonomy of researchers and teachers that guarantees, as a last resort, their social utility and also justifies their public backing.

Finally, development, a central concept in the aftermath of the war, relies on a guarantee that the poor countries will catch up with the rich countries, provided that they comply with the principles of Western modernity.

All of these postulates are largely contested today. The scope of the impact of science and technology calls for consideration of the way they are related to democracy and to the principle of caution; the gap between rich and poor societies and the negative consequences of the present forms of development call for a deep reassessment of the conceptions of modernity and of the relationship between material development – the accumulation of goods – and human development – the blossoming of being.

In the past fifty years, conflicts have been numerous and murderous, and international relations have been punctuated by multiple crises. The two pillars of international life, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Charter of the United Nations, have constituted, nevertheless, a reference framework and enabled incontestable progress in the organisation of international relations. In particular, a non-negligible intellectual and legal elaboration has resulted from the Declaration of Human Rights with the introduction of second- and thirdgeneration rights and the recent creation, for example, of the International Penal Court.

A great number of treaties of state or world dimension have been drawn up and ratified in most areas of international life. And yet, one is struck by the increasing gap between the magnitude of global interdependence and the relative weakness of the regulation mechanisms that are set up, mechanisms that are spread out amongst the many United Nations agencies, with many contradictions amongst the policies, and giving de facto pre-eminence to free trade. Progress in the organisation of international life is now hindered by the absence of common bases and by the absence of real negotiations on the global challenges, on the agendas and on the priorities. This means that a lot of countries, especially amongst the developing countries, do not perceive the functioning of the international community as truly legitimate, do not see any real fairness in it, have a second-class status and therefore endorse it no more than reluctantly.

A first emergency is to give a new legitimacy, well beyond their simple legality, to world regulations, and this can only happen by taking into account the sensitivities of the different civilisations and jointly defining the functions to be assigned to the international community, in what conditions it is to function, how the agenda is drawn up and the forms of negotiation. All of this supposes, previously to a constitution, a common ethical base.]

The preceding thoughts define the contours of the Charter for a Responsible, Plural and United World:

• a) The Charter must meet humankind's major challenges for the coming century. It cannot be a circumstantial text related to a particular field of human activity, such as the environment, for example. In the Platform for a Responsible and United World, we identified in particular three crises of a new magnitude, qualified as "crises in relations and in interaction": amongst societies; amongst human beings; between humankind and its living environment. The Charter must offer a reference framework to manage these three crises. The Platform also highlights how the powerful tools that humankind has forged for itself – science, technology and the market – have tended to impose their own laws. The Charter must offer a solid point of support to recover command over them.

- b) The Charter must act as the foundation for a progressive legal, political, institutional and social architecture, generating new regulations for our societies. It must therefore express general principles, susceptible to being then applied progressively, more precisely, to a set of actors people, states, corporations, etc. and of fields of human activity.
- c) The Charter is a Charter of the rights and responsibilities of humankind facing the challenges of the twenty-first century. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Charter of the United Nations were mainly about the rights of individuals and of peoples. Today, the impact of human activity on the whole of humankind and on the biosphere implies also placing the accent on the duties and responsibilities of individuals, powers and the whole of humankind, with regard to human beings, the future generations, the living world and the planet.
- d) The Charter must express universal principles. Is such universality possible in practice? Is it theoretically conceivable? The question cannot be avoided. The universality of human rights raises a lot of controversy. The dialogue amongst civilisations, amongst philosophical and religious traditions, often includes the quest for the universal, the search for fundamental principles common to all: As human beings living on the same planet, don't we have in common a universal human truth?

Without underestimating the importance of this quest, from which we have tried to take inspiration for the project of the Charter of the Alliance, we observe that we are facing today a concrete imperative. Humankind is growing increasingly. Its activity has a decisive impact on the functioning of the biosphere. If we do not wish to perish, we have to agree on some principles to manage our only and single planet jointly. The possibility of expressing universal principles is not only today a major philosophical and anthropological question; the need to express common management principles has become mandatory, even though we do not know what we have in common.

B - The Charter for a Responsible, Plural and United Europe is both the reflection of the world charter and the expression of the specific situation of Europe.

At the Nice Summit, as a result of preliminary work featuring exemplary dimensions, a Charter of Fundamental Rights was adopted. It is the historic continuation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As such, it is honourable. But let us stand outside Europe and look at it as seen from the rest of the world. It is one of the wealthiest regions, one whose development model relies largely on the consumption of material resources, mostly non-renewable and therefore to the detriment of the rest of the world. One cannot found citizenship exclusively on the benefit of the rights citizens are guaranteed. These have to be completed with their ensuing duties. For the same reasons, the European Union cannot be founded on a catalogue of rights without recognition of the duties that are their counterpart.

To find its rightful position in the construction of a world society, the European Union should take the initiative of drawing up the **Charter of a Responsible, Plural and United Europe**. It would be at the same time the expression of the citizens' rights and duties, and that of the rights and duties of all of Europe with regard to the world. There are projects. They could be put to debate. Here are some possible elements:

a) The citizens and the nations of Europe constitute the European Union to build jointly a pacific, democratic and united society.

b) The Union must offer all of its nationals, regardless of gender, race, opinion, religion, age or origin, the conditions of a full human development that respects other peoples, ecological balances and the interests of the future generations.

c) The European Community and the different territorial communities that constitute it have the duty, jointly and in solidarity, to set up the conditions for this full human development. They have the duty to ensure social cohesion within the Union, to reinforce solidarity with the other peoples of the planet, to look after the respect and consideration of the interests and the rights of the future populations, to preserve, at the different scales, the human and natural balances, the quality of the relations between human beings and their environment, and the wealth and the cultural and ecological diversity of Europe.

d) To assume this duty, the European Union, the states and the territorial communities that constitute it, are formed on the principle of active subsidiarity: the definition and the implementation of the means are in the power of the authorities close to the citizens, but exercised in the framework of stated principles, effective solidarity and evaluations made at the level of the Union and the states that compose it. Subsidiarity reflects the human wealth of Europe, fruit of its unity and its diversity.

Delegation of the conduct of the policies to the authorities close to the citizens is the reflection of diversity. It results from a twofold requirement of democracy and efficiency. Of democracy, because it gives the citizens the power to orient and control their future. Of efficiency, because it makes it possible to take into account the complexity and the diversity of the situations, the coherence and the complementarity of the policies.

The statement of the guiding principles of the policies, the exercise of solidarity and the completion of evaluations at the level of the Union and the states that compose it are, in turn, the reflection of their unity. United, European citizens would like to be in many ways: they acknowledge the interdependence of their destinies; they wish through their unity to contribute actively to a socially responsible and cautious management of the planet; they have the will to control the market forces jointly, as well as those of science and technology, so as to subordinate them to the construction of a society in solidarity.

e) The citizens of the Union, beyond the diversity of their traditions and their religious and political convictions, wish to build European society on common fundamental principles, fruit of their common historic heritage, and to guide the relations of human beings with the biosphere, the rights of individuals and the duties of the authorities. They decide to make of these principles the measure of the progress of society.

f) The relation of human beings with the biosphere relies on the following principles:

- Principle of solidarity: co-operation and solidarity amongst human beings, their mutual respect and with regard to nature, the possibility of ensuring for everyone a life of dignity, are the true measures of progress and Humanity.
- Principle of diversity: the diversity of cultures, as that of living beings, is a common good that all human beings have the duty to preserve.
- Principle of responsibility: men, companies, states, international agencies, are individually and collectively responsible for the survival of the Earth and of the living; their responsibility is proportionate to their wealth and their power.
- Principle of caution: human societies must not implement new products or new technology until they have acquired the capacity to fully understand their present and future risks.
- Principle of management: the Earth, which our forebears have bequeathed us, is not ours; we owe it to the future generations. We therefore have to respect its essential goods: water, air, soil, the ocean, the living and the great balances necessary for life.
- Principle of conservation: human societies must tend towards forms of production and lifestyles without removal, disposal and waste likely to endanger the Earth's essential balances.
- Principle of frugality: the richest, those who are caught up in the society of waste, have to change their lifestyle, moderate their consumption and relearn frugality.

g) The full human development of citizens and nationals of the Union involves the possibility for everyone to lead a life in dignity, in conformity with his or her convictions in respect of the common principles that found life in society in Europe.

Specifically, everyone must be able:

- to exercise the rights and to assume the duties that will ensure, through their balance, social existence and recognition, which connects them in solidarity to the other human beings;
- to have their knowledge, experience and capacity to create recognised and appreciated;
- to build over time the social connections and rooting that enable a full social existence;
- to benefit a priori of the trust of their fellow citizens and of the institutions, and to be able to make a fresh start, with renewed trust, in case of failure or fault;

- not to be discriminated against or to be the subject of contempt for reasons, amongst others, of gender, age, convictions, or geographical or ethnic origin;
- to have the assurance, when in difficulty and in pain, of an active solidarity;
- to have access to decent housing, to a harmonious and freely chosen living environment;
- to develop freely and outside of market relations, the sharing of information, knowledge, and goods and services that weave social networks;
- to obtain the means for a life in dignity;
- to have access to beauty, to knowledge, to health and to education;
- to have a grasp on their future.

h) The Union has the duty:

- to look after the implementation, by the states and the authorities, of territorial policies enabling the full respect of the above principles that govern the relations of men amongst themselves and with the biosphere;
- for this purpose, to draw up, through a permanent confrontation of the experiences of the public authorities and the multiple expressions of the European society, the specifications of the policies to be conducted and the evaluation of their results.
- to set up forms of co-operation amongst authorities that will allow them to exercise their duties jointly; to set up the forms of solidarity necessary for such co-operation, financial ones in particular;
- to allow the inhabitants and the authorities of the Union to benefit from the wealth of the experience resulting from its diversity and to allow every national to know and to claim their rights;
- to verify that its own initiatives are not in contradiction with the above principles.

Proposal 2: Set up a European public forum of citizens debate.}

Many citizens of the European Union complain of the complexity of its procedures and institutions. This reputation, along with criticism for lacking transparency, harms the legitimacy of Community bodies and increases the perception that as institutions they are disconnected from the citizens. In fact, European institutions are rather less complex than those of their Member States. What the European Union is lacking, on the other hand, is forums of public debate, whose function would be, precisely, to clarify the challenges and to specify their terms by virtue of contradictory debate. This absence of a public stage is not really made up for by either the Commission and the Parliament's information and public-relations efforts, nor by the organisation of debates in the national frameworks. Nor does the election of European MPs fulfil this function, because it takes place in the framework of national politics.

Setting up this European public forum is an emergency. Who can organise it and according to what procedures?

First, the question of **procedures**: A Web-site and electronic-forum combination, which collects the basic information, structures the data bases, offers downloadable documents, keeps an archive of the debates and makes interactive debate possible, constitutes a good solution. We have two prototypes in this respect, the second having benefited from the experience of the first.

[The first prototype is the "EU-ACP forum" (www.ue-acp.org)

In the summer of 1998, the Committee on Development and Co-operation of the European Parliament, through the voice of its Chair, Michel Rocard, expressed the desire that a collective thinking process should be organised amongst actors of the ACP countries and of the European Union who were deeply rooted in the concrete practice of co-operation as seen from the point of view of the beneficiaries of European aid. This process was to contribute to the ongoing renegotiations of the Lomé Convention and to possible changes in the co-operation between the European Union and the ACP countries. The European Commission and the Charles Léopold Mayer Foundation (FPH) accepted to finance this thinking process. The FPH was in charge of its facilitation.

The process was conducted in three phases: a phase during which on-the-field experience reports were collected along with an audit of the Commission; an international seminar in Brussels in March 1999; the setting up of an email-based forum (www.ue-acp.org) to discuss the proposals resulting from the first two phases. The forum, initially planned to last four months, went on for ten months thanks to a new joint financing of the European Union and the FPH. Its success revealed a need and an opportunity.

The ue-acp.org forum was the opportunity to generate a continuing debate on European aid and whether it responded to the expectations and realities of the citizens of the Union and of the ACP countries. It enabled information sharing, proposal building, and a collectively defined evolution of the role of co-operation and its effects.

It responded with precision to the criticism of complexity and distance of which the European institutions are so often accused. International co-operation is, indeed, a long chain leading from the public opinion of the donor countries to the people and organisations of poor populations, and moving through political and administrative bodies and a variety of brokers. Some have a voice, and information and influence networks, and can command the political negotiations and the mazes of the administrative and legal systems. Others, at the end of the chain, collect the fruit of all this or undergo its consequences. The result is a major deficit in transparency and dialogue. More particularly, the result of all this is an absence of voices from the rural communities, the

inhabitants of the underprivileged districts of the cities, small-scale farmers' organisations, grassroots organisations. And yet, at the end of the day, it is at their level that we can measure the relevance and efficiency of the aid that is granted, in principle in their favour. A public forum of debate that makes negotiations and procedures transparent, that limits the locational advantages of the brokers, that puts the management of public money in public view and monitoring, that circulates reports of concrete experiences, that tests intentions against facts, that measures the progress actually accomplished, that gives the voices of the different actors equal value: this can be seen as decisive progress, as much for the construction of democracy as for the progress of governance.

The ue-acp.org experience showed that an e-mail forum run according to strict ethical and methodological rules, facilitated in a truly professional manner, combining the virtues of an experience data base with a search engine and those of a live debate, constituted the prototype of a new democratic forum. We feared at the start that the forum's ambition would encounter two stumbling blocks: the low rate of Internet equipment in the ACP countries, in particular the African countries, which might have reserved access to the forum for a privileged few; and the exhaustion of the debate after the enthusiasm of the first few weeks. These two obstacles turned out to be less significant than anticipated. The first, because interest in the forum generated some discussion circles locally, with people having access to the Internet acting as network leaders. The second, because the organised construction of the debate over time and the possibility of using the Web site as source of information, constantly enhanced with new contributions and new experiences, made interest in the forum grow, instead, as the months went by.

There are still many obstacles to overcome, for example those linked to multilingualism. But becoming a collective ambition, enacted by several networks, owned by different groups, these obstacles can be easily overcome.

Thus appeared beyond the identity of its promoters and the process that gave it birth, a new type of public good, a form of virtual public forum, an international agora, a method of democracy, a means of control by the citizens over public action, a collective instrument of social and cultural change.

This new type of public good is especially appropriate in the present phase of transition marked by the signature of a new partnership agreement in Cotonou and by the foreign-aid reform of the European Union.

The Web site of the Alliance is the second prototype (www.alliance21.org).It was in this framework that the European Assembly of the Alliance was prepared. Capitalising on eu-acp.org experience, the Web site of the Alliance is highly structured and gives tremendous visibility to the links amongst the different issues dealt with. It shows that one can, within a single Web site, conduct a large number of discussion forums simultaneously, provided that each one is based substantially on previous work (a discussion, in itself, rarely makes it possible to draw up proposals on complex questions) and is facilitated and moderated.]

The advantage of the Web and e-forum association is to be able to deal, in an innovating way, with the sensitive question of the identity and the power of convocation. The links between the sites make it indeed possible to go from one core facilitation group to another. Similarly, the structuring of the "documents" and "experience reports" data bases are a guarantee for the plurality of points of view.

Now back to the first question: **Who can organise such a Web site?** Probably not the European Commission. It hasn't the necessary distance and besides, the European Union only covers part of the European territory. The same reservation can be applied, although less so, to the European Parliament. Considerations on the lasting quality of the eu-acp.org forum can, here too, serve as a prototype. It is necessary first to distinguish on the one hand, the specifications of a forum of public debate on European governance and on the other, the **nature of the operators** in charge of implementing it.

a) The specifications would be consigned in a constituent charter comprising two parts: ethical and methodological.

The **ethical** part is above all an ethics of openness, respect and mutual attention. Participants are not there to settle accounts, they do not resort to invectives, they know that reading their messages takes their readers' time, they share a common ambition, which is to improve the relevance and the efficiency of co-operation. Their contribution aims to move the discussion forward, to change the practices, to reinforce, through the clarity of democratic control, the legitimacy and the credibility of public management and international co-operation.

It is then an ethics of truth. Everyone has their point of view, their part of the truth, but prefabricated rhetoric, self-promotion and apologetic rhetoric are excluded.

It is finally, an ethics of the concrete. The reality of co-operation is not in the texts and in the procedures but in the effects on the field, and such effects can only be appreciated through the compilation of concrete experiences. Little does it matter that bad co-operation is the result of bad principles, bad procedures, a bad understanding of the challenges or inappropriate relations amongst the actors. What counts is the effects that it produces.

Then a methodological part. The forum is a process with multiple participants, built in space and time. These three features determine its methodology.

Involving multiple participants, it is designed like an international meeting, with a succession of themes to be debated, with organised contributions, with regular summaries, with active facilitation methods, and if necessary, with task groups, breaks, moments of assessment.

Organised remotely, it requires special attention to those who remain silent, active facilitation, incitement to speak out, regular assessments. The participants must be spokespersons for group contributions.

Organised over time, the quality of its organisation and the filing of its contributions and results are even more important than the vivacity of the immediate discussions.

[From the start, the Web site of the eu-acp.org forum presented more than two hundred and sixty concrete experiences. A search engine made it possible for those who consulted the Web site to browse at leisure in the mass of experiences and thus to benefit freely from the collective intelligence. Better yet, the facilitation methods of the forum allowed other participants to contribute their own experience thanks to a dialogue with the Forum Co-ordination. Such interaction, of which the debate is only the visible part of a constantly enhanced collective experience, is a central element of the methodology.]

b) Implementation of the specifications would be taken in turns.

The forum is a public good that must be managed independently from the public authorities. This is the guarantee of its neutrality and the condition of its credibility. In this sense, such a forum is radically different from the Web sites that are display cases for institutions. Such display cases are necessary and legitimate, but they fulfil a different function.

As a public good, the forum calls for public or private financing of public interest – as for example by foundations, according to procedures that will ensure if possible its continuity.

To choose a fixed facilitation center for the forum would be probably contrary to its vocation and to its nature. Such a choice would lead to laborious negotiations as in so many cases of establishment of international institutions. Worse yet, this would tend, precisely, to "institutionalise" and to "localise" something that in its essence is a non-localised network operation. The **procedure used for the Olympic games** could serve as inspiration: every other year the facilitation team of the forum would change and its center of gravity would be alternately in Latin Europe, Northern Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. In the two years preceding it, a **Committee of public debate** made up of independent figures would receive and study **applications**, necessarily constituted by a syndicate of universities (one's first thought is, naturally, the "Jean Monnet Chairs" that exist in many European countries) and by civil-society organisations. An "Ethics Committee" and a "Method Group" would be otherwise in charge of auditing the specifications and of making sure that the teachings of experience and technological advances are continuously integrated into the specifications.

Proposal 3: Found governance on a new approach to territories

Cities and territories are at the heart of the challenges that have resulted from the dead ends of the present development model. They are also in the best position to find solutions for them.

First of all, they are at the heart of contemporary challenges. In a context of globalisation, all the problems that arise at the global level also arise at the local level. Certainly, cultural, economic and social contexts vary from place to place on the planet, but there is no longer any isolated local situation, protected from the globalisation phenomenon. All the cities that are swept into the movement of modernisation tend at first to develop energy-intensive systems of transportation and housing, to cut themselves off from their local environment, to disregard common goods and to privilege market relations, to enter the global market, to experience a growing rift, within the population, between a fraction of the rich population with high consumption habits and an increasingly frustrated poor population, to face a loss of social cohesion and urban violence, etc.

And yet the cities and territories are also the most likely to find solutions to these challenges. This might be the central paradox of economic globalisation. The more the economies are interconnected in the global market, the more interdependent environmental problems are, the faster science and technology are transferred, and the more one could think that the solutions can only be global. This is, however, not true. Indeed, *given that the crises of the present development model are crises of relations, it is starting from the territories, where these relations can be understood and reconsidered, that sustainable development models can be invented.*

In the eighties, the maxim "think globally, act locally" became very popular. But it is rather the opposite that is true: we need to think locally to act globally. To think a situation locally is complex: the more environmental, social and economic problems are interconnected, the more it is necessary to think reality in its complexity}, as illustrated in a place where all these relations are perceptible, that is to say, at the local level. {{To think complexity, you have to "think with your feet", to think on the basis of local, everyday reality, where the connections between the different categories of problems are concrete evidence.

But an isolated city or territory cannot profess to think the world and transform it all alone. Hence the importance of the second part of the sentence: "act globally". It is by linking up in international thinking-and-action networks, by comparing their innovative responses to the challenges of today's society that cities and territories can contribute to responding to the challenges of the present world.

Just recently, the Unity Congress of the International Union of Local Authorities that was held in Rio de Janeiro in May 2001, bore witness to this awareness. We have moved beyond the times when cities were demanding autonomy of management. Cities now know that they are facing a historic challenge that they have to meet, the challenge of inventing a sustainable development model. They know that they are in the best position to meet it. But they also know that they can only meet it by building international networks of experience sharing.

Most cities are still very far from meeting this challenge. They will make an efficient contribution to inventing a sustainable development model for the planet only at the price of a deep transformation of their form of management and of a radical evolution in their way of thinking.

Indeed, although it is possible, at the level of a city or a territory, to describe, to enhance and to comprehend the relations between the people, between the social groups and between the local society and the world outside, this does not mean that cities and territories actually do so at the present moment.

In fact, the contrary is true. A large modern city, in France for example, knows infinitely less about the system of relations within it and with the outside world than a Chinese village did one thousand years ago. This is an astonishing paradox, but easily explained: the development of science, technology and information systems have made us increasingly ignorant of our own concrete reality. Indeed, as everything is converted into a monetary value and everything is traded in a market that has become global, monetary value has become the measure of all things **and understanding of concrete relations has blurred**. A French city, for example, knows little about its energy consumption, has a fuzzy grasp of the exchange flows of goods and services with the outside, and a poor understanding of the exchange flows or the circulation of knowledge within its own territory.

Moreover, the present form of management of our cities and our territories is characterised by segmentation. Public management, far from enhancing relations, contributes to ignoring them and to making them disappear. Such **segmentation** is observed on three planes:

- the separation between the different levels of governance; the state, the regions, the cities and the basic territories each have their jurisdiction and work in their own corner;
- the separation between the different areas of local management; housing, transportation, water, the environment, agriculture, and economic and market development

are dealt with separately. Each political and administrative leader jealously protects his or her area of competence and is not much capable of working with the other services;

• the separation between public management and the rest of society: invested with the responsibility for the general interest, public management often acts by imposing norms and rules, without any capacity of dialogue and partnership with the rest of society.

To overcome this state of affairs, to make it possible for cities and territories to contribute to sustainable development, first it is necessary, as for every deep mutation of society, to **change the system of thought**. I see two major dimensions to this change: to conceive the territory as a system of relations; to recognise the territory as the basic building block of the governance of tomorrow.

First, to conceive the territory as a system of relations. If you ask a local administrative and political representative what a territory is, if you ask a local planner what a territory is, the question will seem so obvious to him that he will laugh in your face. To him a territory is a physical surface delimited by administrative and political borders. This is the territory that he manages and he knows none other. Of course, he knows that within this territory and between it and the rest of the world there are many exchanges and relations, but as far as he is concerned, that is not part of his work!

The change in view consists precisely in defining today's world as a complex system of relations and exchanges. All the present innovations in territorial management are moving in that direction: to have a better understanding, to better exploit, to better develop, to have a better command over these systems of relations.

This is the case, for instance, when we need to set up **an integrated management of water** at the scale of a river basin. Everything depends on a subtler understanding of how the water cycle works, of the exchanges that take place, of the withdrawals linked to human activity, of the possibility of exploiting complementary forms of use, etc. Water management supposes a partnership amongst the different categories of actors.

It is also the case when, aware of the impact of industrial activities on the environment, we undertake an **industrial ecology** process, by seeking to make the waste of one economic activity the raw material of another, as for the different parts an ecosystem.

It is further the case when we try to exploit the economic potential of a region by taking a fresh start from an understanding of its intellectual resources and **by facilitating synergies between the education system and economic activity.**

It is finally the case when, facing poverty and unemployment, we promote **a system of local currency** through which a work force that does not find an outlet on the world market is able to connect locally with a goods-and-services demand.

Second dimension of change in the system of thought: to recognise the city and the territory as the basic building blocks of tomorrow's governance. All too often, the city and the territory are considered as just local places of application of policies defined at the national, regional and global levels. As if, in the movement of globalisation and economic globalisation, the only possible role for local authorities was to offer ordinary services to the population, while the real decisions are taken at another level. However, in an economy that has become above all an economy of combination of knowledge, know-how and information and is no longer a combination of material factors of production, the actual places where knowledge, know-how and information can be combined have become decisive places, even on an economic level. For the last two centuries, companies, in particular large companies, have been the main place for the systematic organisation of knowledge and know-how. In fact in many cases, in the large European, Chinese and Soviet companies, they have been the main place of social organisation, where entire aspects of everyday life were taken care of: housing, social welfare, leisure and sometimes even education and trade. In the course of the twentieth century, the responsibility for the organisation of public services and everyday living conditions were progressively transferred to the local authorities, with companies concentrating directly on production. The twenty-first century will be the century of cities and territories. These will be the major economic and social actors.

To accomplish these two major mutations, a radical transformation of local governance is necessary. This includes four dimensions: ethics; territorialisation; partnership; active subsidiarity.

Ethics. Local authorities must assume their historic challenge. To do so, they need to agree on an ethical basis: reconciling unity and diversity; recognising everyone's rights; accepting the link between power, responsibility and control; promoting full and open human development; being the place where the distant past is linked to the distant future.

Territorialisation. The administrative services that manage the different areas of activity must learn to work together at the most local level, to find integrated answers to the problems that they meet.

Partnership. The administrative services and the local authorities must learn to manage their relations differently with the different groups of the population, in particular the poorest groups, calling upon them as real partners who are to provide a sharp analysis of their own problems and to invent solutions.

Active subsidiarity. None of the major problems of our time, whether environmental, social or economic, can be dealt with at only one level of governance: state, province or city. Whether it is regarding water, energy, economic development, the fight against poverty, housing, transportation, education, research & development, etc., the real solutions can only come from a close collaboration between the different levels of governance. This calls for a reform of the philosophy of the public action, basing it on what it is appropriate to call active or interactive subsidiarity: subsidiarity, because it is from the local level, not from the central level, that the solutions to the problems need to be thought out, and interactive subsidiarity, because solutions can only come from collaboration amongst the different levels.

Proposal 4: Establish new relations between public institutions and the rest of society

Participatory democracy, private-public partnership, integration of NGOs in European governance, consensus conferences, public-interest services, development of the third sector... all these watchwords show that everyone is aware, at least appears to be, that a strict separation between the management of the public good, which would be the exclusive domain of public institutions, and the management of private affairs, which would be the exclusive domain of private actors, no longer makes much sense. The public good is produced by the combination, possibly in partnership, of public and private actors. Purely representative democracy, which consists in delegating decisions of public interest entirely to elected representatives for several years, is no longer adapted to the citizens' level of training and information, nor to the complexity of the issues that have to be dealt with. Their statement requires a multiplicity of experiences and competences, and their solution would be in the co-operation of a variety of actors.

And yet, Europe has yet to find the appropriate answers to the major challenges of the renewal of citizenship, democracy and public action. Neither trompe-l'oeil "participation" nor "the association of NGOs to European decisions" (Which NGOs? Representative of what? How would they be selected? Accountable to whom?) are satisfactory solutions.

We recommend four combined systems:

- development of "socioprofessional" trans-European networks
- generalisation of consensus conferences
- organisation of partnership processes for the elaboration of solutions
- adoption of partnership charters constituted according to the philosophy of ISO standards.

a) development of "socioprofessional" trans-European networks

The various European social and professional actors are not highly organised. If they are, they are organised only at the scale of the European Union and often on a corporatist basis. The

European Economic and Social Committee is a good reflection of this weakness. The three socioprofessional networks – employers, trade unions and associations – do not correspond at all to the challenges of the century that is beginning. We recommend to form a network organisation inspired from the "socioprofessional networks" of the Alliance. Each socioprofessional network would not be a "representative body" but a networking forum with a charter of the socioprofessional network expressing the responsibilities of the social and professional group involved with regard to the world of tomorrow.

b) Setting up European consensus conferences

The understanding of complex problems with multiple scientific, social, economic, political, cultural or ecological dimensions, cannot be exclusively reserved to experts. Quite the contrary, experts are often specialised, which does not always put them in a favourable situation to grasp all the dimensions of the problem they are dealing with. About twenty years ago, Denmark invented, to meet the challenge of democracy, consensus conferences through which ordinary citizens, acting as a court jury would, learn about the different aspects of a problem, discuss them and remit their findings. These do not bind the political authority, which is the only body legally authorised to make decisions. But there is great wealth in this citizens' understanding of things. So far, these conferences have only been held on a national scale. Their organisation on a European scale should become one of the ordinary methods for the construction of a public citizens' debate on European policies. The issue of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), for which the European Union took a firm and different stand to that of the United States, would be the opportunity to create a prototype of this form of citizens' participation.

c) Organisation of partnership processes for the elaboration of solutions

Traditionally, decision making is the key moment of political responsibility: according to the precept "to govern is to choose", political leaders are supposed choose from amongst several alternative solutions. Actually, the more a problem is complex, which is the case for most European problems, the more it supposes an answer in partnership involving a great number of actors. Under these conditions, the central political question is less to choose from amongst alternative solutions than to draw up through partnerships a satisfactory solution for the different actors. Political responsibility is thus transferred from decision making to the organisation of the dialogue process which is to lead to the choice of a solution in partnership. The European Union, through its "committee" practice, has long-standing expertise in dialogue amongst states and amongst the different interest groups. But these interest groups expresses themselves more through lobbies in Brussels than through a transparent and public dialogue procedure amongst the different spheres. It is these dialogue procedures that it would now be necessary to exploit and to make public.

d) The adoption of partnership charters

Partnership between actors of different natures is no easy matter. Often, it runs up, beyond the declarations of principles, against innumerable cultural, institutional or legal obstacles. Good will is not enough to overcome them. International experience shows that a true partnership requires specific rules of the game drawn up by the partners. The experience of companies with the development of ISO norms showed that the end quality of the products relied less on the

methods of control at the end of the chain than on the processes implemented throughout the entire chain.

Similarly, in Europe, the rules of partnership should bear on the conditions of the organisation of the dialogue from the start of the process to the joint assessment of the implementation. These rules should be consigned in partnership charters, the main principles of which would be defined at the European scale and the specific methods defined on a case by case basis, so as to adapt them to every context and to allow their ownership by the different stakeholders.

Proposal 5: Reform European institutions according to the active subsidiarity principle and apply the latter to European policies

A) Reform European institutions according to the active subsidiarity principle

Under the inspiration of its founding fathers, Europe was built on the basis of its objectives, not of the means to reach them. In reaction to the increasing importance of Europe in the everyday lives of all of its citizens, resistance to it also became sharper, on the one hand from the states, whose prerogatives were being progressively nipped at, and on the other from the citizens themselves, who contested the universal imposition of uniform rules without any consideration for the diversity of situations and contexts. Subsequently, the temptation, in the framework of the European Convention, is to limit the future action of the Union, on the one hand by assigning to Europe a closed list of competences, on the other hand by implementing the subsidiarity principle. Neither of these systems is enough to build the Europe that we aspire to.

Two elementary findings are the foundation of governance today:

- No contemporary problem can be dealt with at a single level of governance, no matter what the issue is: economic development, the balance between human activity and the biosphere or solidarity and the social cohesion.
- The art of governance is to guarantee both maximum unity, consideration of the interdependencies, and maximum diversity, consideration of the differences of context, culture and aspirations.

It follows that:

• Tomorrow's fundamental principles of governance are those that define the relations amongst the different levels of governance rather than those that define the rules for management of society at only one level.

Interdependence and unity cannot be guaranteed through the statement of uniform rules, which constitute an obligation of means, but through **the statement of common guiding principles**, with the duty to obtain a given result, principles to be translated locally into action, according to the specificities of each particular society and the context.

This is why any attempt to define for the long term a list of competences, i.e., what a given level of governance – here the European Union – is to focus on and take responsibility for exclusively, is dangerous and makes no sense. Worse yet, defining areas of competence constitutionally will petrify governance and the institutions, will divide public action into rigidly separated fields of action, whereas the objective of public action in a complex world is on the contrary to interlink actions taken from a broad range of types of domain. Administrative segmentation, which has been a thousand times denounced as bureaucratic cancer, would thus be mistaken for the very essence of the democracy.

We therefore propose that the European Constitution currently being elaborated should be based on the active subsidiarity principle, i.e. on rules of shared competence as defined above. The corollary to that would therefore be to define the European Union, not in terms of the specific fields in which it acts, but in terms of the reasons for which it is brought to act in any field (the objectives) and in terms of the way in which it does so (the active subsidiarity principle).

B) Implement the active subsidiarity principle in European policies: example for the fight against exclusion

The active subsidiarity principle is not only intended to be a constitutional principle and the foundation of the internal organisation of the Commission. It is also and especially a new practice, the mechanisms of which we are going to illustrate in the fight against the exclusion.

Let us examine the three pillars of a policy against exclusion: first pillar, cover the multidimensional nature of exclusion; second pillar, conduct a partnership action including different actors of society and with the excluded persons themselves; third pillar, ensure, beyond the universal rights recognised by the law, effective access to these rights.

In the three cases, it is the concrete implementation of these three pillars that constitutes the real challenge and in the three cases this implementation is played out at a local level. This is obvious for the first two pillars, but it is just as true for the third. Indeed, the effective implementation of rights supposes systems of information, of continued support and of recourse, amongst others, for the most vulnerable and most isolated populations, those most cut off from the institutions. It is without a doubt at a local level that appropriate systems can be designed.

To assert that these three pillars of the fight against exclusion would be no more than wishful thinking if they were not designed and implemented at a local level does not mean, however, that local communities have a monopoly over their design and implementation. It only means that it is at the level of **clearly identified territories** that these policies must be designed and implemented.

The local level is also essential because exclusion, in everyone's opinion, is not only limited to a problem of lack of income. **Exclusion refers, more generally speaking, to the system of relations**. Relations to the job market of course, but also and more generally speaking, relations with others. Exclusion is defined as the feeling of being useless to the world, of being less that nothing. The recognition granted to a person of his/her value on the job market is in itself a component of the broader question of dignity, of one's esteem, which is played out in a system of relations. Similarly, everyone recognises that the capacity of the excluded to become actors of their own future is a major dimension in coming out of the state of exclusion. And although the actual employment issues can be dealt with to a greater or lesser degree at a national scale, it is definitely at the local level that systems of relations are built.

Again, it is at the local level **that consistencies and partnerships can be designed and developed**. Although the existence of interministerial co-ordination bodies constitutes a breakthrough on the national level and the recognition that consistency amongst sectoral actions is even more important that the quality of the action conducted in each sector, this is not enough - far from it - to guarantee, in practice, the consistency of multi-dimensional policies and partnership.

As for partnership, it cannot be decreed. **It is the fruit of a social learning** marked on the one hand by cultural traditions (for example the Dutch tradition of negotiations) and on the other hand by local learning, amongst the actual actors. A true partnership involves a preliminary time of mutual listening, credibility and trust, things that cannot just be decreed but have to be built over time.

The pre-eminence of the local level in policies for the fight against exclusion derives, finally, from the extreme diversity of local situations. A comparison of European cases shows the dissimilarity of situations from one country to another, but at the same time it conceals the extraordinary diversity of the situations of the different territories within a same country. This is why **it is important that every territory should be able to define its own strategy**. National mobilisation can focus on the general principles of solidarity, such as social transfers and the affirmation of universal rights, but local mobilisation alone, founded on concrete realities, is able to determine relevant solutions. It is at the local level that something can be achieved in such a way that everyone feels they are socially useful (is no longer "less than nothing"), either through employment, either in a non-market framework. Yet experience proves that, at the least to start with, it is in the vast field of local jobs and activities that everyone's social usefulness is most frequently accomplished, responding to the new needs of society, which are mainly needs of services to people and of community management (environment, security, leisure activities, etc.). Once again, it is in local partnerships that opportunities can be generated.

Nonetheless, although it is perfectly obvious that policies in favour of social cohesion have to be defined mainly on the local level, **this does not mean that the local approach is the right one per se, nor that it is enough in itself**. In a word, the "local" angle is indispensable but not sufficient: it has to be combined with the other scales of approach. In fact, promotion of a local development cut off from consideration of the other scales of development can lead to the worst in terms of excess.

Giving precedence to policies designed and conducted on a local scale does not imply a local approach that is disconnected from everything else. Need for national solidarity derives directly from the diversity of the situations of exclusion within the same country. What can be said about territories can also be said about people who have been excluded: some people, who have taken on their share of the sacrifices made in the name of industrial and economic restructuring, would not benefit, without national solidarity, from the sharing of the benefits drawn from these sacrifices. What is local therefore only makes sense in a general framework of thinking as to how it fits into what is national, European and global. Hence, in the articulation of the different scales of governance.

It is obvious to everybody that the fight against social exclusion, and the definition and the implementation of new strategies involve actions and policies at the different levels of governance, from Europe to the local level. Nevertheless, the lessons of this evidence are far from having been drawn, mainly because those who promote these new approaches are not always aware of the radical nature of this innovation. Indeed, when guidelines have been determined at the level of Europe and these have been drawn up on the basis of experience sharing and of an experimental program, and then states or local communities are asked to implement these guidelines in a way that is adapted to the diversity of the contexts, there is more than just a statement that different levels of governance are involved, there is an outline of the methods needed to articulate the different levels!

The elaboration of general principles of articulation amongst the different scales of governance is all the more necessary that there has to be consideration of more than just the three levels: European, national and local. The very concept of "local" cannot be defined in merely administrative terms. Everyone knows that in the fight against exclusion you have to reach a more specific level than the municipal one in order to conduct relevant, concrete action. This means that, in designing a new conceptual framework for the organisation of local communities, rules have to be defined not only for the articulation amongst the state, the province and the city, but also for the articulation between the city level and that of the city district.

At the other end, Europe is not the highest level of globality. The world conference on social exclusion, which took place in Copenhagen in 1995, played a significant role in bringing about awareness of the new strategies that need to be adopted in this area. This means that the process of elaboration of the guidelines formulated on a world level, on the basis of the experiences of the states and of the third sector, and that the national systems of assessment of the implementation of the guidelines defined in Copenhagen are all part of this articulation of the levels of governance.

We are therefore not starting from scratch. In the field of strategies for the fight against social exclusion, there are a number of practices currently being set up. These practices have features in common. The process always consists in starting from the experience accumulated at a given level and, on the basis of these experiences, in drawing up, at a higher level, the guidelines that will serve to define the different policies adapted to the different specific contexts. Collective meetings of some form or another and public procedures of assessment are the means for appreciating the implementation of the

guidelines and for building a "learning" system, that is, a system capable of changing in terms of what it learns.

What is being foreshadowed by the emergence of ideas for the articulation of the different scales of governance and of active subsidiarity is simply the processes of a new governance. Whether in the dialogue groups in Belgium, the consultation councils in the Netherlands, which are associations of public-services users, the national conferences on social exclusion, or the principles of assessment of public policies, the emphasis is moving from the simple statement of a legislative framework to collective processes of debate, policy definition and assessment.

Proposal 6: Reform the European Union's founding policies: the agricultural policy as an example

The common agricultural policy and its reform can be the symbol of this new stage in European construction. The CAP was one of the pillars of the construction of the European Economic Community, then of the European Union. It sponges up half of the European budget and organises, with the regional funds, the redistribution of resources amongst the different countries of the Union. In the past forty years, the context that justified its establishment has changed radically. Yet the CAP has only been given successive "touch-ups", obtained through bargaining amongst the different national interests. **The capacity to change it is in fact an essential test for European governance**. There is a good opportunity there. The priority given to food self-sufficiency, legitimate in the aftermath of the war, has turned into a frantic effort to sell off surpluses. The crisis in output-intensive agriculture is symbolised by BSE. The absurdity of a systematic circulation of livestock is symbolised by the spread of foot-and-mouth disease. Plenty of opportunities are provided here to put the debate on new bases. The replacement of the German Ministry of Agriculture by a Ministry for the Protection of Consumers, Food and Agriculture is not just an epiphenomenon or an emotional response to the cases of BSE discovered on German soil. It prefigures the necessary recomposition of agricultural policies.

How can this refounding be achieved?

A – Through the organisation of a true European public debate, and in order to escape the rationale of the different lobbies (farmers' organisations, agri-foodstuffs industry) and of national-interest bargaining, we need to show that the European Union:

- **knows how to popularise a public debate**, knows how to organise a citizens' forum in immediately comprehensible terms;
- heeds its citizens and its different social groups;
- is capable of defining a project of civilisation that is not just following the lead of the USA and of the full-market economy.

When the common agricultural policy was set up, the emergency of increasing agricultural production was obvious and the actual agricultural population represented, at least in some of the countries of the Community, a numerically very significant social category. These two historical facts have changed radically in the last forty years. And yet, the debate on the common agricultural policy has continued to be locked in on itself, formulated in technical terms that have excluded non-specialists, and privileging negotiations between the corporatist interests of a declining agricultural population and the economic interests of the different states of the Union.

The first stage of the public debate, as we showed by organising a European process materialised in 1999 in a meeting in Valencia, Spain, is to involve the different sectors of society **in defining the very terms of the debate**. It is no longer possible to base the debate on considerations that are internal to the agricultural sector. As soon as these are left behind, **the terms of the debate change** and what comes to the forefront are considerations dealing with health, the quality of life, the multi-functionality of territories, the quality of food, sustainable-development policies, employment appreciation, the development of city-countryside relations, etc.

Once the terms of the debate have been set, we need to allow the development of a discussion, amongst all the different social groups, of their aspirations, priorities, analyses and proposals. Tomorrow's agricultural policies can no longer be allowed to privilege only the traditional actors of agriculture. We can in fact observe in most European countries that the inventors of the new forms of agriculture, whether in the field of organic farming, of the development of rural tourism, of rural entrepreneurship, of the sustainable management of territories, are not often farmers' sons. We cannot, on a given territory, limit the benefits of a public policy to a category of juridically or sociologically defined "farmers". In the name of what justice would we do that? And, in fact, even if we wanted to, international negotiations would soon make that impossible. How could we reserve measures to protect the environment or the new rural trades for people who otherwise produce wheat without having U.S. negotiators, particularly mindful on this point, interpret this as indirect aid to production? Yes, a European public debate is definitely necessary on the management of rural areas. Yes, it is necessary to transfer financing of poor-quality agricultural production to financing of quality products and of the maintenance of diverse and multifunctional European rural areas. Yes, it is necessary to promote territorial-ecology practices that take into account the balance between humankind and the biosphere.

B - Through the establishment of a territorial policy founded on completely new criteria

Contrary to what some people think, it is rather easy to decree norms that will produce radical mutations in agriculture. Apparently elementary norms, for example which fix the rate of worms or of organic matter that characterise the maintenance of soil fertility, the chemical-nitrogen content per hectare, the composition of products to qualify their nutritive quality, would suffice to upset the agricultural landscape and make it possible, as a consequence, to recover true biodiversity, as much in natural, uncultivated areas as for raised and cultivated species. They would also lead to a balance of production within local territories, moving against the growing specialisation of the major agricultural regions that has been observed in the past forty years and is contrary to the healthy rules of balanced ecosystems and energy saving.

C - Through the establishment of a conversion strategy

Such a radical transformation of agricultural practices calls for a conversion policy. **The cost of this conversion must not be underestimated**. Moving from output-intensive cereal farming to mixed farming based on organic farming, for example, involves new materials, new practices and several years of retraining during which expenses are not offset by returns. Part of the common agricultural policy and of the means currently committed to it should no longer be allocated to supporting prices in the major markets but to conversion policies. This would simply be as in the early sixties, when the European countries and the Community were able to design an ambitious structural policy. Subsidised loans, active policies to support the establishment of better-trained farmers, recognition of quality or territorial labels, subsidies for organic farming, joint financing for conversion: there are many means to accomplish this.

D - Through the implementation of the active subsidiarity principle

A conversion policy that would take full advantage of the diversity of products and would support the balance, at a more local scale, between needs and production, requires, precisely, defining new principles of governance.

The new common agricultural policy should be made to be the privileged field of application for the active subsidiarity principle. A lot would stand to be lost if aid to support the prices of primary commodities were to be replaced by the re-nationalisation of the common agricultural policy. The European Union would then be no more than just a distributor of aggregate amounts, with each state defining its own policy. Rather, a territorial policy would involve, precisely, developing on the basis of experience sharing at the level of the Union, the main principles and duties to achieve a given result that would be put to the states, which in turn would delegate the policy to the regions, then, moving closer, to the agricultural sites, the only levels at which a systemic approach is possible. It is also this active subsidiarity principle that would make it possible to avoid in certain countries where agricultural corporatism remains strong, that territorial management should be delegated exclusively to agricultural bodies, the ambition of many of which is more to reserve the subsidies for a particular sector than to undertake the deep conversion that is necessary.

This approach to rural agricultural territories and, more broadly, to the entities including urban and rural territories, would be perfectly suited to the elaboration of charters of rights and duties. Thus, the reform of the common agricultural policy would also be an opportunity to test the fertility of a Charter for a Responsible, Plural and United Europe, as previously mentioned.

The present common agricultural policy that has been applied in the name of Europe's right to feed itself is also a denial of other peoples' right to feed themselves. Reforming it would finally pave the way to a policy on rural areas and food at the scale of the different regions of the world.

Proposal 7: Set up a "European public management" task force for intervention on behalf of countries that request it, in particular the new democratic countries and countries in transition

The European Commission and the European States are in a contradictory position with regard to the governance issue: the functioning of the European Commission is in crisis and yet, European construction is, on a world scale, the main contribution to the progress of governance in the twentieth century. Thanks to the diversity of the governance traditions of the different countries that make it up, the European Union constitutes an extraordinary pool of experiences in democratic governance. Moreover, European construction has supposed deep innovations: introduction of the idea of shared sovereignty; the art of managing unity and diversity. In addition, every European country has trained its own political and administrative elite.

Our proposal is to create on a European scale a "University without walls", a European school of administration and governance that would be a place of continuous training of European Union officers.

The Union should clearly mark the stakes of a revolution of governance and its will to be a driving political and social actor to steer this revolution. Compared to the progress in private management, public management has not been the subject of a conceptual and technical investment in the second half of the twentieth century, thus lagging considerably behind the private sector in everything related to management techniques. The European Union must mark its will to invest in public management, not only to the benefit of the Union but also to the benefit of third countries. One of the products of such a commitment would be to constitute a European task force that could rapidly be put at the service of the new democratic countries and of the countries in transition. The constitution of this task force would be part of Europe's will to build a European doctrine for the construction of peace and democracy.

Proposal 8: Promote a new world governance

European governance is only part of the broader revolution of governance. Europe's contribution to this revolution therefore requires the elaboration and circulation of common principles of governance. Moreover, the European construction is in itself an important contribution to the conception of a world governance that is all at once legitimate, democratic and efficient. Facing the rise of American unilateralism, facing the affirmation of the new American military strategy according to which the United States of America intend to prevent the development of any competition in the realm of military means of action, the European Union must take a powerful initiative on world governance. It must propose the principles on which governance must be founded, present a set of concrete proposals for the application of these

principles on a world scale and take a political initiative marking its determination to contribute to this transition.

The proposals for reforming the architecture of global governance drawn up by the Alliance for a Responsible, Plural and United World are presented as a contribution to this initiative.

Proposal 9: Reinforce relations between Europe and the countries of the South

Amongst the developed countries, Europe is the one that has shown most clearly the need to undertake a deep conversion in its lifestyle and development model. It recognises the inconsistency between consumption and the renewable resources of the planet. This singularity of the European countries appeared in Europe's commitment to the elaboration and the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol on the greenhouse effect and of the Cartagena Protocol on biodiversity.

Similarly, the European Union played a key role in moving from the GATT to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). It is aware of the need to improve the definition of the goods and services that are, or are not, subject to the opening of markets, to take into greater account the negative impacts of the opening of markets on the poor countries and to make the objectives of economic development consistent with environmental preservation.

The European Union is by far the first contributor to the World Bank and to the International Monetary Fund, as well as to Official Development Aid. Finally, ever since the Lomé Convention, the European Union has shown its willingness to assume its responsibilities as former colonial powers by signing privileged co-operation agreements with the ACP (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific) countries.

So far, these assets and commitments have not really been used to build a specific, politically strong and forward-looking relationship with the countries of the South. The European Union's influence in the multilateral financial institutions has been neutralised by the divergent strategies of its Member States; Official Development Aid remains dominated by bilateral rationales; European aid policy, generous in its principle, has not so far set up procedures and provisions that are able to support strategies for the long-term human and economic development of the ACP countries.

Our proposal is to take a powerful initiative in favour of the countries of the South comprising the following five parts:

• Reinforce a coalition in favour of sustainable development, in particular in favour of the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and the Cartagena Protocol.

- Take the initiative of a reform of the World Trade Organisation to make it more legitimate, democratic and efficient and to reinforce its consistency with strategies in favour of sustainable development.
- Display a European doctrine of peace and commit Europe to preventive action in favour of peace, providing a creative articulation of actions involving the use of force and actions aiming to reconstruct society.
- Propose a generations contract to the ACP countries; undertake for this a reform of the European aid policy; privilege the long-term construction of a civil society in the ACP countries.
- Build a common strategy vis-à-vis the multilateral financial institutions and propose their reform.

Proposal 10: Prepare a European Constituent Assembly including representatives of the different social and professional spheres to draw up the European Charter and the draft of a Constitution

For the European Union, and subsequently the enlarged European Union, to be fully credible in the eyes of its citizens, there needs to be a founding event that provides a clear vision of the civilisation project that Europe is promoting, and common values that are the foundation of this project and of governance in Europe. This event can be a constituent process aimed at drawing up a Charter of Rights and Responsibilities of Europeans and at writing the draft of a constitution.

The experience of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights convention is a first interesting step, but limited in two aspects: limited, first, because, considering the weight of Europe in the world, it is no longer possible to conceive the rights of Europeans without also defining their responsibilities; limited, too, because it has not enabled a true dynamics of democratic debate involving the different European social and professional groups.

With regard to the Constitution, the European Union, if it wishes to remain true to the idea of a civilisation project, cannot be defined by a list of competences. It must be defined through the statement of the common objectives that justify the construction of the European Union as such and the implementation of a shared sovereignty with the states.

A European Charter of Rights and Responsibilities and the draft of a European constitution must be the result of a constituent process, marked by preliminary work then by a Constituent Assembly. This process should be radically different from the present framework of debates organised mainly at the scale of the national public and political arenas. Our proposal is to organise such a constituent process by taking inspiration from the method developed by the Alliance for a Responsible, Plural and United World. It consists in putting on the same level the major dimensions of the diversity of societies: geocultural diversity, "socioprofessional" diversity and thematic diversity. The first means the implication of the local communities and of the states in Europe; the second means involving the different social and professional groups in this constituent process; the third would require highlighting the interconnectedness of the different issues that are Europe's present challenges. The convergence of the three processes would provide an overall view of the objectives and the ethical foundations of the European project.